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FILOSOFIA DELLA MENTE (LAUREA MAGISTRALE)

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Anno accademico 2011/2012

Codice dell'attività didattica
LET0273
Docente
Alberto Voltolini (Titolare del corso)
Corso di studi
[f005-c501] Laurea magistrale in Filosofia
[f005-c504] Laurea magistrale in Scienze storiche e documentarie
[f005-c507] Laurea magistrale in Storia del patrimonio archeologico e storico-artistico
Anno
1° anno 2° anno
Periodo didattico
Secondo semestre - seconda parte
Tipologia
Per tutti gli ambiti
Crediti/Valenza
6
SSD dell'attività didattica
M-FIL/05 - filosofia e teoria dei linguaggi
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Sommario del corso

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Obiettivi formativi

Il corso si propone di investigare la relazione tra proprietà coscienti e proprietà intenzionali degli stati mentali, attraverso una discussione tra le due opzioni principali attualmente in vigore in filosofia della mente su questo tema, l’opzione rappresentazionalista che sostiene che le prime proprietà si possono ridurre alle seconde e quella fenomenologica che ritiene che l’intenzionalità sia primariamente una proprietà fenomenologica.

The course will investigate the relationship between conscious and intentional properties of mental states. The two main options in philosophy of mind on the debate on this issue will be discussed: the representationalist approach, according to which the former properties can be reduced to the latter ones, and the phenomenological approach, according to which intentionality is primarily a phenomenal property.

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Programma

1)       Block, N. 1996, Mental Paint and Mental Latex, in E. Villanueva (a cura di), Perception, Ridgeview, Atascadero («Philosophical Issues» 7), pp. 19-49.

2)       Chalmers, D. 2004, The Representational Character of Experience, in B. Leiter (a cura di), The Future of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 153-81.

3)       Crane, T. 2001, Elements of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford [trad.it. Fenomeni mentali, Raffaello Cortina, Milano 2003], cap.1, §§ 21-26.

4)       Dretske, F. 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), cap.1 e 3.

5)       Horgan, T., Tienson, J. 2002, The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, in D. Chalmers (a cura di), Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 520-33.

6)       Kriegel, U. 2007, Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality, in «Philosophical Perspectives», XXI, pp. 307-40.

7)       Loar, B. 2008, Phenomenal Intentionalities, in «American Philosophical Quarterly», XL, pp. 233-252.

8)       Lycan, W.G. 1998, In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia, in  «Nous» XXXII, pp. 479-487.

9)       McGinn, C. 1997, Consciousness and Content, in N. Block, O. Flanagan e G. Guzeldere (a cura di), The Nature of Consciousness, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), pp. 295-307.

10)   Peacocke, C. 1983, Sense and Content, Oxford University Press, Oxford, cap. 1.

11)   Siewert, C. 2004, Is Experience Transparent?, in «Philosophical Studies», CXVII, pp. 15-41.

12)   Tye, M. 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness: a Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), cap.5.

13)   Tye, M. 2003, Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? in J. Prinz, W. Lycan (a cura di), Mind and Cognition,  Blackwell, Oxford 2007, pp. 707-724.

I testi saranno discussi in forma seminariale durante il corso.

1)       Block, N. 1996, Mental Paint and Mental Latex, in E. Villanueva (a cura di), Perception, Ridgeview, Atascadero («Philosophical Issues» 7), pp. 19-49.

2)       Chalmers, D. 2004, The Representational Character of Experience, in B. Leiter (a cura di), The Future of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 153-81.

3)       Crane, T. 2001, Elements of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford [it.transl. Fenomeni mentali, Raffaello Cortina, Milano 2003], chap.1, §§ 21-26.

4)       Dretske, F. 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), chaps.1 and 3.

5)       Horgan, T., Tienson, J. 2002, The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, in D. Chalmers (eds.), Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 520-33.

6)       Kriegel, U. 2007, Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality, in «Philosophical Perspectives», XXI, pp. 307-40.

7)       Loar, B. 2008, Phenomenal Intentionalities, in «American Philosophical Quarterly», XL, pp. 233-252.

8)       Lycan, W.G. 1998, In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia, in  «Nous» XXXII, pp. 479-487.

9)       McGinn, C. 1997, Consciousness and Content, in N. Block, O. Flanagan e G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), pp. 295-307.

10)   Peacocke, C. 1983, Sense and Content, Oxford University Press, Oxford, cap. 1.

11)   Siewert, C. 2004, Is Experience Transparent?, in «Philosophical Studies», CXVII, pp. 15-41.

12)   Tye, M. 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness: a Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), chap.5.

13)   Tye, M. 2003, Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? in J. Prinz, W. Lycan (eds.), Mind and Cognition,  Blackwell, Oxford 2007, pp. 707-724.

. The texts will be presented in seminars within the course. 

1)       Block, N. 1996, Mental Paint and Mental Latex, in E. Villanueva (a cura di), Perception, Ridgeview, Atascadero («Philosophical Issues» 7), pp. 19-49.

2)       Chalmers, D. 2004, The Representational Character of Experience, in B. Leiter (a cura di), The Future of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 153-81.

3)       Crane, T. 2001, Elements of Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford [it.transl. Fenomeni mentali, Raffaello Cortina, Milano 2003], chap.1, §§ 21-26.

4)       Dretske, F. 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), chaps.1 and 3.

5)       Horgan, T., Tienson, J. 2002, The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, in D. Chalmers (eds.), Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 520-33.

6)       Kriegel, U. 2007, Intentional Inexistence and Phenomenal Intentionality, in «Philosophical Perspectives», XXI, pp. 307-40.

7)       Loar, B. 2008, Phenomenal Intentionalities, in «American Philosophical Quarterly», XL, pp. 233-252.

8)       Lycan, W.G. 1998, In Defense of the Representational Theory of Qualia, in  «Nous» XXXII, pp. 479-487.

9)       McGinn, C. 1997, Consciousness and Content, in N. Block, O. Flanagan e G. Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), pp. 295-307.

10)   Peacocke, C. 1983, Sense and Content, Oxford University Press, Oxford, cap. 1.

11)   Siewert, C. 2004, Is Experience Transparent?, in «Philosophical Studies», CXVII, pp. 15-41.

12)   Tye, M. 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness: a Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, The Mit Press, Cambridge (Mass.), chap.5.

13)   Tye, M. 2003, Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? in J. Prinz, W. Lycan (eds.), Mind and Cognition,  Blackwell, Oxford 2007, pp. 707-724.

The texts will be presented in seminars within the course.

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Testi consigliati e bibliografia

A. Voltolini –  C. Calabi, I problemi dell’intenzionalità, Einaudi, Torino 2009, particolarmente cap. 6.

A. Voltolini –  C. Calabi, I problemi dell’intenzionalità, Einaudi, Torino 2009, partcularly chap. 6.

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Note

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